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decisions. To do that I consider a model where a small and a large country
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(with potentially diﬀerent costs) that supply the domestic market and export
to the third market. Merger decisions in the two countries are modeled as a
simultaneously move game. The paper ﬁnds that ﬁrms in the large country
have more incentives to merge than ﬁrms in the small country. In contrast, the
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11 Introduction
In many European countries there is a heated debate over whether governments
and competition authorities should favor or oppose the creation of national
champions.1 An argument often put forth in favor of national champions is
that bigger ﬁrms will be in a better position to compete in world markets.2
It’s true that the emergence of a national champion might improve a country’s
welfare if it has strong eﬃciency gains and shifts proﬁts away from competitors
in export markets. However, the emergence of a national champion might also
reduce a country’s welfare if the eﬃciency gains are smaller than the loss in
consumer surplus. A national champion might also not be able to shift proﬁts
away from competitors in export markets due to losses in market share.
This paper contributes to this debate by setting up a three-country model
in which ﬁrms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and
compete in a third (world) market. I use the model to study endogenous merg-
ers and mergers that improve national welfare. By comparing the equilibrium
outcomes of these two games I am able to clarify which factors contribute to
the existence of conﬂicts of interest between ﬁrms and governments about the
desirability of national champions.
In this model mergers have eﬃciency gains and are modeled as a simultane-
ous move game. Firms compete à la Cournot, markets are segmented, and there
are no producers in the third market.3 The novelty of my approach is that it
allows for both ﬁrm size and market size asymmetries. Firms can have diﬀerent
costs of production and the three countries can have diﬀerent market demands.
These assumptions make the model more general than previous ones and allow
me state new results that show how ﬁrm and market size asymmetries inﬂuence
incentives for mergers to take place and merger equilibrium outcomes.
The paper starts by studying the incentives that ﬁrms have to merge when
governments do not have an active role in merger decisions. To do that I provide
conditions under which a merger of ﬁrms in one country is proﬁtable conditional
on a given market structure in the other country. My ﬁrst result shows that
the conditions for national ﬁrms to merge are less restrictive: (i) when foreign
ﬁrms are merged, (ii) when ﬁrm size asymmetries are high, (iii) when the export
market is small, and (iv) in the country with the largest domestic market.
The intuition behind the results is the following. When a merger takes place
there are three eﬀects that the ﬁrms involved in the merger need to take into
consideration. First, there is an eﬃciency gain since the high cost ﬁrm transfers
production to the low cost ﬁrm. Second, a merger leads to less competition
both in the domestic market as well as in the export market. These two eﬀects
allow the merged ﬁrm to have a higher mark-up than the highest mark-up of the
1For example, the French government advocated a merger between the electricity and gas
company SUEZ with the ﬁrm GAZ DE FRANCE.
2A recent example in Germany has been the aproval of the merger between the E.ON and
RUHRGAS corporations where the German Minister of Economics argued that size was very
important at the onset of the energy market liberalization in Europe.
3This set-up captures the idea that domestic markets are less competitive than export
markets. See Brander and Spencer (1985).
2individual ﬁrms. Thus, the market power of the ﬁrms involved in the merger
increases in both markets. This eﬀect creates an incentive for mergers to take
place. However, in the export market the merger implies that the market share
of the merged ﬁrm is lower than the sum of the pre-merger market shares of the
ﬁrms involved in the merger. This third eﬀect reduces the incentive for mergers
to occur. We see that a merger increases proﬁts in domestic markets but it does
not necessarily increase proﬁts in the export market.
The conditions for a merger of domestic ﬁrms are less restrictive when foreign
ﬁrms are merged because the market-power gains are higher and the loss of
market share is lower than when foreign ﬁrms are not merged. Incentives for a
merger of national ﬁrms to occur are stronger when ﬁrm size asymmetries are
high because the eﬃciency gains are larger. When ﬁrm size asymmetries are
low the conditions for a merger of domestic ﬁrms are less restrictive when the
export market is small because if the merger leads to losses in the export market
these losses are smaller. Finally, a merger is more attractive to ﬁrms in the large
country than to ﬁrms in a small country because if the merger leads to losses
in the export market these are relatively smaller (compared to the domestic
market gains) in the large country than in the small country.
Next the paper characterizes the equilibrium decisions of ﬁrms assuming
that governments do not interfere in markets. In this game, ﬁrms in each coun-
try decide whether to merge or not to merge. The decisions of ﬁrms in both
countries are made simultaneously. I ﬁnd that for most ﬁrm size and market
size conﬁgurations the equilibrium outcome is for mergers to take place in both
countries. However, if ﬁrm size asymmetries are low and the size of the export
market is suﬃciently big there are no mergers. Additionally, I ﬁnd that if the
market of the large country is at least 1.26 times the market of the small coun-
try, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium with a merger in the large country
but no merger in the small country.4
The paper proceeds by studying the incentives that governments have to
merge national ﬁrms when ﬁrms have a passive role in merger decisions. To do
that I provide conditions under which a merger of ﬁrms in one country increases
national welfare conditional on a given market structure in the other country.
I ﬁnd that the conditions for a government to merge national ﬁrms are less
restrictive: (i) when foreign ﬁrms are merged, (ii) when ﬁrm size asymmetries
are high, (iii) when the export market is big, and (iv) in the country with the
smallest domestic market.
The intuition behind the results is as follows. To ﬁnd out whether a merger
improves or worsens national welfare, a government must take into account the
merger’s impact on proﬁts in the domestic and export market and on consumer
surplus. If ﬁrm size asymmetries are high, then a merger has high eﬃciency
gains. High eﬃciency gains raise proﬁts in the domestic and in the export market
(the increase in mark-up makes up for the loss of market share) and lead to lower
consumer surplus losses. Thus, governments have more incentives to merge
4For a small set of ﬁrm size and market size conﬁgurations the merger game played by
ﬁrms has multiple equilibria.
3national ﬁrms when ﬁrm size asymmetries are high. If ﬁrm size asymmetries
are moderate, there is a trade-oﬀ between welfare losses in the domestic market
(proﬁts in the domestic market increase less than the reduction in consumer
surplus) and proﬁt gains in the export market. In this case, governments have
more incentives to merge national ﬁrms when the export market is big. Finally,
a merger is more attractive to the government of the small country because
when ﬁrm size asymmetries are moderate, the losses in the domestic market
due to the merger are higher in the large country than in the small one.
The paper also characterizes the equilibrium decisions of governments when
ﬁrms play a passive role in merger decisions. In this game, governments in
each country decide simultaneously whether to merge or not merge national
ﬁrms. I ﬁnd that governments choose to merge national ﬁrms when (i) ﬁrm size
asymmetries are high or (ii) ﬁrm size asymmetries are moderate and the export
market is relatively bigger than the market of the small country. Governments
choose not to merge national ﬁrms when (i) ﬁrm size asymmetries are low or
(ii) ﬁrm size asymmetries are moderate and the export market is not very big.
Additionally, I show if the market of the large country is at least 2.14 times the
market of the small country, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium where the
government of the small country merges ﬁrms but the government of the large
country does not.5
I also use the model to state conditions under which ﬁrms and governments
interests regarding the desirability of national mergers are aligned or in conﬂict.
To do that I compare the set of equilibria of the merger game played by ﬁrms
to that of the merger game played by governments. I ﬁnd that if ﬁrm size
asymmetries are high and the export market is big, then there are no conﬂicts
of interest between national ﬁrms and governments: all favor the creation of a
national champion. The interests of national ﬁrms and governments are also
aligned if ﬁrm size asymmetries are small and the export market is big: all
oppose the creation of a national champion. However, if ﬁrm size asymmetries
are moderate or small and the export market is relatively small, then a conﬂict
of interest arises: ﬁrms wish to merge but governments oppose the mergers.
Finally, I show that the conditions under which conﬂicts of interest occur
are less restrictive in the large country than in the small country. This result
is driven by the asymmetric equilibria of the merger game played by ﬁrms and
by the asymmetric equilibria of the merger game played by governments. Com-
paring the set of equilibria of the two games I show that when one of these two
types of asymmetric equilibria occur, ﬁrms in the large country prefer to merge
but the government of the large country prefers to block the merger. Thus the
model predicts that, everything else constant, competition authorities should
be less actively involved in the regulation of export industries in small countries
than in large ones.
The questions that this paper addresses have many links with the existing
literature on merger and competition policy, specially with papers which ex-
5There is also a set of ﬁrm size and market size conﬁgurations where the merger game
played by governments has multiple equilibria.
4tend the analysis to open economies.6 This literature has taken two diﬀerent
directions. One line of research focuses on nationally optimal merger policies
and merger proﬁtability when trade policy instruments are available to national
governments—e.g., Richardson (1999), Horn and Levinsohn (2001), and Huck and
Conrad (2004). The other line of research is based on the concept of “external
eﬀects” of a merger to outsiders. An important early contribution to this topic
is Farrel and Shapiro (1990). This concept was extended to open economies by
Barros and Cabral (1994). This literature has derived rather general conditions
under which a merger beneﬁts, or harms, the parties not participating in the
merger. It does not, however, explicitly consider that a merger may lead to cost
reductions and so it can not provide a complete characterization of post-merger
equilibrium.
This paper takes a diﬀerent approach by focusing on a three-country model
where ﬁrms in each country share their domestic markets and jointly compete
in a third market. This approach is similar to that of Hauﬂer and Nielsen (2008)
and Suedekum (2006). Hauﬂer and Nielsen (2007) consider a similar set-up but
assume that ﬁrms have identical costs of production and that the two competi-
tor countries have the same market demand. However, they allow for market
size asymmetries between the domestic markets and the export market. They
ﬁnd that the policies enacted by a national merger authority tend to be overly
restrictive from a global eﬃciency perspective. In contrast, all international
mergers that beneﬁt the merging ﬁrms will be cleared by either a national or a
regional regulator, and this laissez-faire approach is also globally eﬃcient.
Suedekum (2008) analyzes mergers in three-country model and, like Hauﬂer
and Nielsen (2008), assumes that ﬁrms have identical costs of production and
the two competitor countries have the same market demand. However, there are
iceberg transport costs between the domestic markets and the third market. He
uses this framework to study the proﬁtability and social desirability of national
versus international mergers. He ﬁnds that national mergers can have a negative
impact in world surplus, and so national competition policy can be seen as too
permissive. However, the promotion of national mergers can be in the interest
of individual countries if rent extraction possibilities are strong enough. He also
shows that cross-border mergers are more attractive than domestic mergers.
2 Set-up
Consider three countries: a small country, s, a large country, L, and a third
country, t. Before any merger takes place there are 2 ﬁrms in the small country
and 2 ﬁrms in the large country. There are no ﬁrms in the third country. Firms
in the small and the large countries sell their product in the domestic markets
and export it to the third country. Thus, there is no bilateral trade between the
small country and the large country and ﬁrms compete in the third (or export)
market.
6The traditional analysis of mergers and acquisitions in industrial organization—Salant et
al. (1983) and Deneckere and Davidson (1985)—usually neglects the eﬀects of country borders.
5The inverse demand function in the small country is Ps = a−Qs,with a > 1
while the inverse demand function in the large country is PL = a − γQL,with
0 < γ ≤ 1. The parameter γ measures the level of market size asymmetry
between the small and the large countries. If γ = 1 the inverse demand curves
are the same and so the markets of the two countries have the same size. If
0 < γ < 1 the market of the large country is bigger than the market of the small
country, that is, for any given price, demand in the large country is greater
than demand in the small country.7 The inverse demand function in the export
market is Pt = a − βQt, with 0 < β ≤ 1. The parameter beta represents the
market size of the export market. Demand in the export market can be greater
than (when β < 1) or equal to (when β = 1) demand in the small country
market and can be smaller than (when γ < β), equal to (when β = γ), or
greater than (when β < γ) demand in the large country market.
Firms in the small and large countries are fully owned by residents and
produce a homogeneous good. Marginal costs are assumed to be nonnegative
and constant. There are no ﬁxed costs (this rules out gains from economies of
scale in mergers).8 Marginal costs of ﬁrms are given by cv1 = c, cv2 = c + ∆,
where v = s,L and ∆ ∈ [0,(a − c)/3]. The parameter ∆ is an index of cost
asymmetry. If ∆ = 0 all ﬁrms have the same cost. I assume that ∆ must be
smaller than or equal to (a − c)/3 so that, in the absence of mergers, even the
less eﬃcient ﬁrm makes nonnegative proﬁts in all markets. It is useful to deﬁne
δ = ∆/(a − c) and use it as a summary measure of asymmetry.
Following Barros (1998) I assume that when a merger between two ﬁrms
occurs the less eﬃcient ﬁrm ceases production.9 Because marginal costs are
constant, when two ﬁrms merge the merged entity will shut down the high-
cost unit and use only the low-cost unit for production. Let i + j stand for
the merger between ﬁrms i and j. Then, the merged entity’s marginal cost is
equal to min(cvi,cvj). Therefore, a merger can be viewed as an acquisition of a
high-cost ﬁrm by a low-cost ﬁrm.10
Firms compete in each market à la Cournot, that is, each ﬁrm chooses non-
cooperatively and simultaneously the quantity that maximizes its individual
proﬁt.11 Each ﬁrm sees the markets it serves as segmented, that is, it is respon-
7The reciprocal of γ measures how many times the market of the large country is bigger
than the market of the small country. For example, if γ = 0.25 the market of the large country
is four times the market of the small country.
8Transportation costs between s and t and between L and t are assumed to be equal to
zero. Transportation cost can be greater than zero (but lower than a) without changing
qualitatively the results in the paper.
9Barros (1998) proposes a framework with three asymmetric ﬁrms and where mergers are
endogenously determined. He tries in this way to explain the intuition behind the relationship
between initial market concentration and size asymmetry of ﬁrms, showing that a negative
relation should be expected.
10Barros (1998) approach is also used by Qiu and Zhou (2007). Perry and Porter (1985)
and Farrell and Shapiro (1990) use other approaches to model the impact of a merger on an
industry’s cost structure.
11The assumption of Cournot competition is in line with much of the literature on mergers.
Theoretical and empirical arguments in defence of the Cournot model are presented by Hauﬂer
and Nielsen (2005). The model proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) in which ﬁrms
6sible for the choice of how much to produce in each market and it considers not
just the output of other ﬁrms but their own choices about where to produce that
output as unaﬀected by its actions. Thus, ﬁrms play separate Cournot games in
each market as they take as given the output of each rival in each market and
not the total output of each rival in all markets. This means that each market
can be analyzed independently of the other markets.
The starting point of the analysis is a situation where no merger has yet



























The ﬁrst-order conditions to this problem are:











− csi = 0.
Solving the ﬁrst equation with respect to qsi we obtain the best reply of ﬁrm si








Solving the second equation with respect to qt
si we obtain the best reply of ﬁrm












































The ﬁrst-order conditions to this problem are:
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choose capacities in the ﬁrst period and compete in prices in the second period generates
Cournot outcomes.
73 Proﬁtability of Conditional Mergers
My ﬁrst result provides conditions under which a merger in one of the countries
is proﬁtable for a given market structure in the other country.
Proposition 1:




s (δ) ≤ β ≤ 1, and ﬁrms in the large
country are not merged, then a merger in the small country is proﬁtable.




s (δ) ≤ β ≤ 1, and ﬁrms in the large
country are merged, then a merger in the small country is proﬁtable.






L (δ) ≤ β ≤ 1, and ﬁrms in the small
country are not merged, then a merger in the large country is proﬁtable.






L (δ) ≤ β ≤ 1, and ﬁrms in the small
country are merged, then a merger in the large country is proﬁtable when.
Corollary 1 summarizes the implications of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1: When ﬁrms in two countries compete in an export market, the
incentives for national ﬁrms to merge are higher: (a) when foreign ﬁrms are
merged, (b) when ﬁrm size asymmetries are high, (c) when the export market is
small, and (d) in the country with the largest domestic market.



















Figure 1 illustrates how the incentives for a merger to take place in the small
country depend on β and δ. It displays on the horizontal axis the parameter
delta, the index of ﬁrm size asymmetries and on the vertical axis the parameter
beta, which represents the market size of the export market.
8The thin dotted curve in Figure 1 represents the equation β = fL1+L2
s (δ)
and characterizes incentives for a merger in the small country when ﬁrms in
the large country are not merged. To the right (left) of this curve ﬁrms in the
small country choose (not) to merge. The thin dotted curve in Figure 1 tells
us that if ﬁrms in the large country are not merged and ﬁrm size asymmetries
are suﬃciently high, δ ≥ 0.11475, then a merger of ﬁrms in the small country is
proﬁtable. However, if ﬁrms in the large country are not merged and ﬁrm size
asymmetries are suﬃciently low, δ ≤ 0.11475, then a merger of ﬁrms in the small
country is only proﬁtable if the export market is not too big, fL1,L2
s (δ) ≤ β.
This is the content of Proposition 1 part (i).
The thick solid curve in Figure 1 represents the equation β = fL1,L2
s (δ) and
characterizes incentives for a merger in the small country when ﬁrms in the large
country are merged. To the right (left) of this curve ﬁrms in the small country
choose (not) to merge. The thick solid curve in Figure 1 tells us that if ﬁrms
in the large country are merged and ﬁrm size asymmetries are suﬃciently high,
δ ≥ 0.0(6), then a merger of ﬁrms in the small country is proﬁtable. However, if
ﬁrms in the large country are merged and ﬁrm size asymmetries are suﬃciently
low, δ ≤ 0.0(6), then a merger of ﬁrms in the small country is only proﬁtable
if the export market is not too big, fL1+L2
s (δ) ≤ β. This is the message of
Proposition 1 part (ii).
The intuition behind these two results is as follows. The merger raises proﬁts
in the domestic market since it implies moving from a duopoly to a monopoly.
However, the impact of the merger on proﬁts in the export market may be favor-
able or unfavorable depending on ﬁrm size asymmetries. If ﬁrm size asymme-
tries are high the merger also raises proﬁts in the export market. This happens
because high ﬁrm size asymmetries imply a large eﬃciency gain which raises
mark-ups (the diﬀerence between price and marginal cost) enough to make up
for the loss of market share. In contrast, if ﬁrm size asymmetries are low the
merger reduces proﬁts in the export market. In this case, the merger is only
proﬁtable if the proﬁt gains in the domestic market are bigger than the proﬁt
losses in the export market. This happens when the export market is not too
big.
Comparing parts (i) to (ii) of Proposition 1 we see that a merger of ﬁrms in
the small country is proﬁtable under less restrictive conditions when ﬁrms in the
large country are merged than when ﬁrms in the large country are not merged.
This happens because if ﬁrms in the large country are merged than a merger of
ﬁrms in the small country always leads to losses in the export market. When
ﬁrms in the large country are not merged and ﬁrms in the small country merge
there is a move from four to three ﬁrms in the export market. By contrast, when
ﬁrms in the large country are merged and ﬁrms in the small country merge there
is a move from three to two ﬁrms in the export market. A move from three to
two ﬁrms has associated a larger increase in mark-ups and a smaller loss of
market share for small country ﬁrms than a move from four to three ﬁrms.
Parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 1 provide conditions under which a merger
of ﬁrms in the large country is proﬁtable when ﬁrms in the small country are not
merged—part (iii)—and when they are merged—part (iv). The intuition is similar
9to that of parts (i) and (ii), respectively. The novelty here is that the conditions
for a merger of ﬁrms to be proﬁtable are less restrictive in the large country
than in the small country. This happens because for low ﬁrm size asymmetries
the gains in the domestic market due to the merger are higher in a large country
than in a small one.
4 Merger Game Played by Firms
I will now characterize the equilibrium decisions of ﬁrms in the two countries
assuming that governments do not interfere in markets. As the starting point of
the analysis I assume that no merger has taken place in either country. Firms
in the small country decide jointly whether they wish to merge or not. Firms
in the large country also decide jointly if they wish to merge or not. The joint
decisions of ﬁrms in each country are taken simultaneously. Thus, we have a
simultaneous move game and we can use Nash equilibrium to make predictions
about behavior.
Let the generic merger game played by ﬁrms be denoted by F2,γ. Denote
the strategies available to ﬁrms in the small country as m (merger) and n (no
merger). Denote the strategies available to ﬁrms in the large country as M
(merger) and N (no merger).The relevant payoﬀs of this game are summarized
in Table I in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibria of the merger game played by ﬁrms
when the market size of the large country is greater than or equal to that of the
small country and less than or equal to 1.26 times the size of the small country’s
market. Before stating Proposition 2 deﬁne
ps =
(63γ − 100β) − (738γ + 800β)δ + (1647γ + 2000β)δ
2





(63 − 100β) − (738 + 800β)δ + (1647 + 2000β)δ
2
13 + 162δ − 603δ
2 . (2)
Proposition 2: Let 0.79365 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
(i) If (β,δ) satisfy 0 < β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ), then NE(F2,γ) = (n,N);
(ii) If (β,δ) satisfy max{0,fL1+L2
s (δ)} < β ≤ f
s1,s2
L (δ), then NE(F2,γ) =
{(n,N),(m,M),(ps,m;pL,M)} where ps and pL are given by (1) and (2), re-
spectively;
(iii) If (β,δ) satisfy max{0,f
s1,s2
L (δ)} < β ≤ 1, then NE(F2,γ) = (m,M).
Figure 2 illustrates how the set of equilibria of the merger game played by
ﬁrms depends on β and δ when the market size asymmetry between the small
and the large country is low.12
12The ﬁgure is drawn for γ = 0.85, that is, when the market of the large country is 1.177
times the market of the small country. The qualitative predictions of the model are the same



















As in Figure 1, the thick solid and the thin dotted curves in Figure 2 char-
acterize incentives for a merger in the small country. The thick dotted curve
in Figure 2 represents the equation β = f
s1+s2
L (δ) and characterizes incentives
for a merger in the large country when ﬁrms in the small country are merged.
The thin solid curve in Figure 2 represents the equation β = f
s1,s2
L (δ) and char-
acterizes incentives for a merger in the large country when ﬁrms in the small
country are not merged. To the right of each curve ﬁrms merge. To the left of
each curve ﬁrms do not to merge.
The two solid curves in Figure 2 determine the areas that deﬁne the diﬀerent
equilibria of the merger game played by ﬁrms. The area in Figure 2 to the right
of the thin solid curve represents the set of β and δ where the game has a
unique equilibrium where ﬁrms in the small country merge and ﬁrms in the
large country merge: (m,M). The area to the left of the thick solid curve
represents parameter conﬁgurations where the game has a unique equilibrium
where ﬁrms in the small country do not merge and ﬁrms in the large country
do not merge: (n,N). Finally, the area between the two solid curves represents
parameter conﬁgurations where the game has multiple equilibria. In that area
we have two PSNE, (m,M) and (n,N), and one MSNE where ﬁrms in the small
country merge with probability ps and ﬁrms in the large country merge with
probability pL: (ps,m;pL,M).13
Thus, Proposition 2 tells us that if 0.79365 ≤ γ and ﬁrm size asymmetries
are high, δ ≥ 0.11475, there will be mergers in both countries. This happens
because when ﬁrm size asymmetries are high, mergers generate proﬁt gains in
the domestic and in the export markets. When 0.79365 ≤ γ and ﬁrm size
13It follows from the deﬁnition of ps and pL that ps < pL in the range of parameters where
the MSNE is well-deﬁned.
11asymmetries are moderate, 0.0(6) ≤ δ ≤ 0.11475, mergers are not as attractive
since they lead to gains in the domestic market but losses in the export market.
In this case we have two possible situations. If the export market is suﬃciently
small, f
s1,s2
L (δ) ≤ β, then ﬁrms in the small country merge and ﬁrms in the
large country merge: (m,M). If the export market is small then the domestic
proﬁt gains are larger than the losses in the export market and ﬁrms merge.
If the export market is big, β ≤ f
s1,s2
L (δ), then we have multiple equilibria. If
0.79365 ≤ γ and ﬁrm size asymmetries are low, δ ≤ 0.0(6), mergers are the
least attractive since they generate small proﬁt gains in domestic market and
large losses in the export market. In this case we have three outcomes. If the
export market is suﬃciently small, f
s1,s2
L (δ) ≤ β, ﬁrms in the small country
merge and ﬁrms in the large country merge. If the size of the export market
is intermediate, fL1+L2
s (δ) ≤ β ≤ f
s1,s2
L (δ), we have multiple equilibria. If the
export market is suﬃciently big, β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ), there are no mergers in both
countries.
Proposition 3 characterizes the equilibria of the merger game played by ﬁrms
when the market size of the large country is more than 1.26 times the market
size of the small country.
Proposition 3: Let 0 < γ < 0.79365.
(i) If (β,δ) satisfy 0 < β ≤ min{fL1+L2
s (δ),f
s1,s2
L (δ)}, then NE(F2,γ) = (n,N);
(ii) If (β,δ) satisfy f
s1,s2
L (δ) ≤ β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ), then NE(F2,γ) = (n,M);
(iii) If (β,δ) satisfy max{0,fL1+L2
s (δ)} < β ≤ f
s1,s2
L (δ), then NE(F2,γ) =
{(n,N),(n,N),(ps,m;pL,M)}, where ps and pL are given by (1) and (2), re-
spectively;
(iv) If (β,δ) satisfy max{0,fL1+L2
s (δ),f
s1,s2
L (δ)} < β ≤ 1, then NE(F2,γ) =
(m,M).
Figure 3 illustrates how the set of equilibria of the merger game played by
ﬁrms depends on β and δ when the market size asymmetry between the small
and the large country is high.14
In Figure 3 the intersection of the area to the right of the thick solid curve
with the area to the right of the thin solid curve represents parameter conﬁgura-
tions for where national ﬁrms in each country merge: (m,M). The intersection
of the area to the left of the thick solid curve with the area to the left of the
thin solid curve represents parameter conﬁgurations where national ﬁrms in each
country do not merge: (n,N).
The area to the right of the thin solid curve and to the left of the thick solid
curve represents parameter conﬁgurations where ﬁrms in the small country do
not merge and ﬁrms in the large country merge: (n,M). Finally, the area to the
right of the thick solid curve and to the left of the thin solid curve represents
parameter conﬁgurations where the merger game played by ﬁrms has multiple
equilibria: (m,M), (n,N), and (ps,m;pL,M).
14The ﬁgure is drawn for γ = 0.25, that is, when the market of the large country is 4 times
the market of the small country. The qualitative predictions of the model are the same for



















The thick solid and the thin dotted curves in Figure 3 are equal to the ones
depicted in Figures 1 and 2 since incentives for mergers in the small country
do not depend on the market size of the large country. However, an increase
in the market size of the large country changes the incentives for mergers in
the large country. Comparing Figures 2 and 3 we see that an increase in the
market size of the large country moves the thin solid curve and the thick dotted
curve closer to the delta axis. This means that for low ﬁrm size asymmetries, an
increase in the market size of the large country makes mergers increasingly more
attractive in the large country than in the small country. This happens because
the bigger the market size of the large country, the greater are the domestic
gains of a merger of ﬁrms in that country. So, when ﬁrm size asymmetries are
low and the merger leads to losses in the export market, the bigger the size of
the domestic market the more likely is that the domestic proﬁt gains exceed the
export market losses and the more attractive is becomes for ﬁrms to merge.
The fact that an increase in the market size of the large country makes a
merger increasingly more attractive in the large country but not in the small
country, implies that there now exists an equilibrium where ﬁrms in the large
country merge but ﬁrms in the small country do not merge. This happens when
ﬁrm size asymmetries are low, δ ≤ 0.0(6), and the size of the export market is
intermediate, f
s1,s2
L (δ) ≤ β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ).
5 Welfare Impact of Conditional Mergers
This section provides conditions under which a merger in one country is welfare
improving for a given market structure in the other country. National welfare
13is the sum of consumer surplus and proﬁts in the domestic and export markets.
Proposition 4 describes these conditions.
Proposition 4:
(i) If (β,δ) satisfy 0 < β ≤ gL1,L2
s (δ) = 9
50
−7+82δ−183δ2
5−32δ+44δ2 , and ﬁrms in the
large country are not merged, then a merger in the small country improves that
country’s welfare .
(ii) If (β,δ) satisfy 0 < β ≤ gL1+L2
s (δ) = −1+18δ−45δ2
5−32δ+44δ2 , and ﬁrms in the large
country are merged, then a merger in the small country improves that country’s
welfare.






5−32δ+44δ2 , and ﬁrms in the
small country are not merged, then a merger in the large country improves that
country’s welfare.
(iv) If (β,δ) satisfy 0 < β ≤ gs1+s2
L (δ) = γ −1+18δ−45δ
2
5−32δ+44δ2 , and ﬁrms in the small
country are merged, then a merger in the large country improves that country’s
welfare.
Corollary 2 summarizes the implications of Proposition 4.
Corollary 2: When ﬁrms in two countries compete in a third country, the
incentives for governments to merge national ﬁrms are higher: (a) when foreign
ﬁrms are merged, (b) when ﬁrm size asymmetries are high, (c) when the export
market is big, and (d) in the country with the smallest domestic market.
Figure 4 illustrates how the incentives for the government of the small coun-



















The thin solid curve in Figure 4 represents the equation β = gL1,L2
s (δ) and
characterizes incentives for the government of the small country to merge na-
tional ﬁrms when ﬁrms in the large country are not merged. To the right (left) of
14this curve the government of the small country chooses (not) to merge national
ﬁrms. The thin solid curve in Figure 4 tells us that if ﬁrms in the large country
are not merged and ﬁrm size asymmetries are suﬃciently high, δ ≥ 0.1991, then
the government of the small country chooses to merge national ﬁrms. This is
also the case when ﬁrm size asymmetries are moderate, 0.11475 ≤ δ ≤ 0.1991,
and the export market is suﬃciently big, β ≤ gL1,L2
s (δ). In contrast, if ﬁrms
in the large country are not merged and either ﬁrm size asymmetries are suﬃ-
ciently low, δ ≤ 0.11475, or ﬁrm size asymmetries are moderate and the export
market is not suﬃciently big, gL1,L2
s (δ) ≤ β, then the government of the small
country chooses not to merge national ﬁrms. This is the content of Proposition
4 part (i).
The thick dotted curve in Figure 4 represents the equation β = gL1+L2
s (δ)
and characterizes incentives for the government of the small country to merge
national ﬁrms when ﬁrms in the large country are merged. To the right (left) of
this curve the government of the small country chooses (not) to merge national
ﬁrms. The thick dotted curve in Figure 4 tells us that if ﬁrms in the large country
are merged and ﬁrm size asymmetries are suﬃciently high, δ ≥ 0.17371, then
the government of the small country chooses to merge national ﬁrms. This is
also the case when ﬁrm size asymmetries are moderate, 0.0(6) ≤ δ ≤ 0.17371,
and the export market is suﬃciently big, β ≤ gL1+L2
s (δ). In contrast, if ﬁrms in
the large country are merged and either ﬁrm size asymmetries are suﬃciently
low, δ ≤ 0.0(6), or ﬁrm size asymmetries are moderate and the export market
is not suﬃciently big, gL1+L2
s (δ) ≤ β, then the government of the small country
chooses not to merge national ﬁrms. This is the message of Proposition 4 part
(ii).
The intuition behind these two results is as follows. To know if a merger
improves or worsens national welfare, a government must take into account
the merger’s impact on: (1) proﬁts in the export market, (2) proﬁts in the
domestic market, and (3) consumer surplus. We know from Proposition 1 that
if ﬁrm size asymmetries are suﬃciently high (low) a merger increases (reduces)
proﬁts in the export market. Governments also need to take into account that a
merger increases proﬁts in the domestic market but reduces consumer surplus.
Which eﬀect dominates depends on ﬁrms size asymmetries. When ﬁrm size
asymmetries are high the government should merge national ﬁrms because this
increases proﬁts in the export market and the increase in proﬁts in the domestic
market is larger than the decrease in consumer surplus. When for ﬁrm size
asymmetries are low the government should not merge national ﬁrms since a
merger would reduce proﬁts in the export market and the increase in proﬁts in
the domestic market is not enough to make up for the reduction in consumer
surplus. Finally, for moderate ﬁrm size asymmetries there is a trade-oﬀ between
merger gains in the export market and merger welfare losses in the domestic
market. This trade-oﬀ implies that for moderate ﬁrm size asymmetries, the
government should merge national ﬁrms when the export market is big but not
when the export market is small.
From parts (i) to (ii) of Proposition 4 we see that a merger of ﬁrms in the
small country increases national welfare under less restrictive conditions when
15ﬁrms in the large country are merged than when ﬁrms in the large country are
not merged. This happens because if ﬁrms in the large country are merged
than a merger of ﬁrms in the small country always leads to losses in the export
market. When ﬁrms in the large country are not merged and ﬁrms in the small
country merge there is a move from four to three ﬁrms in the export market.
In contrast, when ﬁrms in the large country are merged and ﬁrms in the small
country merge there is a move from three to two ﬁrms in the export market. A
move from three to two ﬁrms has associated a larger increase in mark-ups and
a smaller loss of market share for small country ﬁrms than a move from four to
three ﬁrms.
Parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 4 provide conditions under which a merger
of ﬁrms in the large country improves national welfare when ﬁrms in the small
country are not merged—part (iii)—and when they are merged—part (iv). The
conditions show that a merger of ﬁrms improve national welfare in the small
country under less restrictive conditions than in the large country since moderate
ﬁrm size asymmetries, 0.0(6) ≤ δ ≤ 0.2(27), the losses in the domestic market
due to the merger are higher in a large country than in a small one.
6 Merger Game Played by Governments
I now assume that national governments determine the market structure in each
country and that ﬁrms play no active role in merger decisions. Like before, I
also assume that at the start no merger has taken place in either country. The
government of each country decides whether to merge or not to merge national
ﬁrms. Given the choice in the other government, each government takes the
decision that maximizes its country’s welfare.
Let the generic merger game played by governments be denoted by G2,γ. The
relevant payoﬀs of G2,γ are summarized in Table II in the Appendix. Proposition
5 characterizes the equilibria of the merger game played by governments when
the market size asymmetry between the small and the large country is low.
Before stating this result deﬁne
qs =
63γ + 250β − (738γ + 1600β)δ + (1647γ + 2200β)δ
2
￿






63 + 250β − (738 + 1600β)δ + (1647 + 2200β)δ
2
13 + 162δ − 603δ
2 . (4)
Proposition 5: Let 0.46621 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
(i) If (β,δ) satisfy max{0,g
s1+s2
L (δ)} < β ≤ 1, then NE(G2,γ) = (n,N).
(ii) If (β,δ) satisfy max{ 0, gL1,L2
s (δ)} < β ≤ min {g
s1+s2
L (δ),1}, then
NE(G2,γ) = {(n,N),(m,M),(qs,m;qL,M)} where qs and qL are given by (3)
and (4), respectively;
(iii) If (β,δ) satisfy 0 < β ≤ min{gL1,L2
s (δ),1}, then NE(G2,γ) = (m,M).
16Figure 5 illustrates how the set of equilibria of the merger game played by
governments depends on β and δ when the market size asymmetry between the



















As in Figure 4, the thin solid and the thick dotted curves in Figure 5 char-
acterize incentives for the government of the small country to merge national
ﬁrms. The thin dotted curve in Figure 5 represents the equation β = g
s1,s2
L (δ)
and characterizes incentives for the government of the large country to merge
national ﬁrms when ﬁrms in the small country are not merged. The thick solid
curve in Figure 5 represents the equation β = gs1+s2
L (δ) and characterizes in-
centives for the government of the large country to merge national ﬁrms when
ﬁrms in the small country are merged. To the right of each curve governments
merge national ﬁrms. To the left of each curve governments do not to merge
national ﬁrms.
The two solid curves in Figure 5 determine the areas that deﬁne the diﬀerent
equilibria of the game. The area to the right of the thin solid curve represents
the set of parameters where the game has a unique PSNE in which governments
merge national ﬁrms: (m,M). The area to the left of the thick solid curve rep-
resents parameter conﬁgurations where the game has a unique PSNE in which
governments do not merge national ﬁrms: (n,N). Finally, the area between the
two solid curves represents the set of parameters where the game has multiple
equilibria: two PSNE, (m,M) and (n,N), and one MSNE where the govern-
ment of the small country merges ﬁrms with probability qs and the government
15The ﬁgure is drawn for γ = 0.85, that is, when the market of the large country is 1.177
times the market of the small country. The qualitative predictions of the model are the same
for any γ ∈ [0.46621,1].
17of the large country with probability qL: (qs,m;qL,M).16
Proposition 5 tells us that if the market size of the large country is not suﬃ-
ciently bigger than the market size of the small country, 0.46621 ≤ γ, and ﬁrm
size asymmetries are suﬃciently high, δ ≥ 0.1991, then governments merge na-
tional ﬁrms. This happens because when ﬁrm size asymmetries are suﬃciently
high, a merger generate welfare gains in both the export and the domestic
markets. If the market size of the large country is not suﬃciently bigger than
the market size of the small country and ﬁrm size asymmetries are moderate,
0.0(6) ≤ δ ≤ 0.1991, then a merger leads to a welfare gain in the export market
but a welfare loss in the domestic market. In this case we have multiple equilib-
ria. Finally, if the market size of the large country is not suﬃciently bigger than
the market size of the small country and ﬁrm size asymmetries are suﬃciently
low, δ ≤ 0.0(6), then governments do not merge national ﬁrms since a merger
generates welfare losses in both the domestic and export markets.
Proposition 6 characterizes the equilibria of the merger game played by gov-
ernments when the market size asymmetry between the small and the large
country is high.
Proposition 6: Let < γ < 0.46621.
(i) If (β,δ) satisfy max{0,gs1+s2
L (δ),gL1,L2
s (δ)} < β ≤ 1, NE(G2,γ) = (n,N);
(ii) If (β,δ) satisfy g
s1+s2
L (δ) ≤ β ≤ min{gL1,L2
s (δ),1}, NE(G2,γ) = (m,N);
(iii) If (β,δ) satisfy max{0,gL1,L2
s (δ)} < β ≤ gs1+s2
L (δ), then NE(G2,γ) =
{(n,N),(n,N),(qs,m;qL,M)} where qs and qL are given by (3) and (4), re-
spectively;
(iv) If (β,δ) satisfy 0 < β ≤ min{gs1+s2
L (δ),gL1,L2
s (δ),1}, NE(G2,γ) = (m,M).
Figure 6 illustrates how the set of equilibria of the merger game played by
governments depends on β and δ when the market size asymmetry between the
small and the large country is high.17
In Figure 6 the intersection of the area to the right of the thick solid curve
with the area to the right of the thin solid curve represents parameter conﬁg-
urations for where governments choose to merge national ﬁrms: (m,M). The
intersection of the area to the left of the thick solid curve with the area to the left
of the thin solid curve represents parameter conﬁgurations where governments
choose not merge national ﬁrms: (n,N).
The area to the right of the thin solid curve and to the left of the thick
solid curve represents parameter conﬁgurations where the government of the
small country chooses to merge national ﬁrms and the government of the large
country chooses not merge national ﬁrms: (m,N). Finally, the area to the
right of the thick solid curve and to the left of the thin solid curve represents
parameter conﬁgurations where the merger game played by governments has
multiple equilibria: (m,M), (n,N), and (qs,m;qL,M).
16It follows from the deﬁnition of qs and qL that qL < qs in the range of parameters where
the MSNE is well-deﬁned.
17The ﬁgure is drawn for γ = 0.25, that is, when the market of the large country is 4 times
the market of the small country. The qualitative predictions of the model are the same for



















Comparing Figures 5 and 6 we see that an increase in the market size of the
large country moves the thick solid curve and the thin dotted curve closer to the
delta axis. This means that for moderate ﬁrm size asymmetries, an increase in
the market size of the large country makes mergers increasingly less attractive
in the large country. This happens because for moderate ﬁrm size asymmetries
a merger leads to welfare gains in the export market but welfare losses in the
domestic market. The bigger the market size of the large country, the greater
are the welfare losses of a merger in that country and the less attractive is for
the government to merge national ﬁrms.
The fact that an increase in the market size of the large country makes
a merger increasingly less attractive in the large country but not in the small
country, implies that when the market size of the large country is suﬃciently big
there exist parameter conﬁgurations where the government of the small country
chooses to merge ﬁrms but the government of the large country chooses not to
merge ﬁrms.
7 Conﬂicts of Interest
This section discusses the implications of the model regarding conﬂicts of interest
between ﬁrms and governments about merger decisions. I show that the model
predicts that if ﬁrms of a small and of a large country compete in a third country,
then the conditions under which conﬂicts of interest occur are less restrictive in
the large country than in the small country.
Figures 7, 8 and 9 display the inequalities that determine the set of equilibria
of the two merger games. By comparing the equilibria of the two games we can
ﬁnd out what are the parameter conﬁgurations of the model that lead to conﬂicts
of interest. Figure 7 illustrates how the set of equilibria of the two merger games
19depend on β and δ when the market size asymmetry between the small and the
large country is low.18
In Figure 7 the thin solid curve with a negative slope represents the equation
β = f
s1,s2
L (δ) and characterizes incentives for ﬁrms in the large country to
merge when ﬁrms in the small country are not merged. The thick solid curve
with a negative slope represents the equation β = fL1+L2
s (δ) and characterizes
incentives for ﬁrms in the small country to merge when ﬁrms in the large country
are merged. These two curves determine the set of equilibria of the merger games
played by ﬁrms. The area to the right of the thin solid curve with a negative
slope represents the (m,M) equilibrium. The area to the left of the thick solid



















The thin solid curve with a positive slope represents the equation β =
gL1,L2
s (δ) and characterizes incentives for the government of the small country
to merge national ﬁrms when ﬁrms in the large country are not merged. The
thick solid curve with a positive slope represents the equation β = gs1+s2
L (δ)
and characterizes incentives for the government of the large country to merge
national ﬁrms when ﬁrms in the small country are merged. These two curves
determine the set of equilibria of the merger games played by governments.
The are to the right of the thin solid curve with a positive slope represents the
(m,M) equilibrium. To are to the left of the thick solid curve with a positive
slope represents the (n,N) equilibrium.
Figure 7 tells us that the interests of national ﬁrms and governments are
aligned when ﬁrm size asymmetries are high and the size of the export mar-
ket is suﬃciently big, β ≤ min{gL1,L2
s (δ),g
s1+s2
L (δ),1} since the equilibrium
18The ﬁgure is drawn γ = 0.85, that is, when the market of the large country is 1.177 times
the market of the small country. The qualitative predictions of the model regarding conﬂicts
of interest are the same for any γ ∈ [0.79365,1].
20of the two games is (m,M). The interests of national ﬁrms and governments
are also aligned when ﬁrm size asymmetries are low and the size of the ex-
port market is suﬃciently big, β ≤ min{fL1+L2
s (δ),f
s1,s2
L (δ)} since the equi-
librium of the two games is (n,N). In contrast, when ﬁrm size asymmetries






s (δ)} ≤ β there is a conﬂict of inter-
ests since (m,M) is the equilibrium of the merger game played by ﬁrms whereas
(n,N) is the merger game played by governments.
Figure 8 illustrates how the set of equilibria of the two merger games depend




















Figure 8 tells us that if the market size asymmetry between the small and
the large country is moderate, then there is a set of parameter conﬁgurations
where the merger game played by ﬁrms has an asymmetric PSNE in which ﬁrms
in the large country choose to merge and ﬁrms in the small country choose not
to merge.20 For these parameter conﬁgurations, the equilibrium of the merger
game played by governments is that governments choose not to merge national
ﬁrms. Thus, we see that when the market size asymmetry between the small and
the large country is moderate there are more parameter conﬁgurations where
there is a conﬂict of interest between the ﬁrms and the government of the large
country than when the market size asymmetry is low.
19The ﬁgure is drawn for γ = 0.55, that is, when the market of the large country is 1.(81)
times the market of the small country. The qualitative predictions of the model regarding
conﬂicts of interest are the same for any γ ∈ [0.46621,0.79365).
20However, when the market size asymmetry between the small and the large countries
is moderate, there is no set of parameter conﬁgurations where the merger game played by
governments has an asymmetric PSNE.
21Figure 9 illustrates how the set of equilibria of the two merger games depend
on β and δ when γ = 0.25, that is, when the market of the large country is 4



















Figure 9 tells us that if the market size asymmetry between the small and the
large country is high, then there is a set of parameter conﬁgurations where there
is an asymmetric PSNE in the merger game played by ﬁrms and another set
of parameter conﬁgurations where there is an asymmetric PSNE in the merger
game played by governments. For the ﬁrst set of parameter conﬁgurations we
have the same situation as before: an absence of a conﬂict of interest between
the ﬁrms and the government of the small country but the presence of a conﬂict
of interest between the ﬁrms the government of the large country. For the second
set of parameter conﬁgurations the equilibrium of the merger game played by
ﬁrms is that ﬁrms merge in both the small and the large country.22 However, the
equilibrium of the merger game played by governments is that the government
of the small country chooses to merge national ﬁrms but the government of the
large country chooses not to merge national ﬁrms. Thus, we see that when the
market size asymmetry between the small and the large country is high there
are more parameter conﬁgurations where there is a conﬂict of interest between
the ﬁrms and the government of the large country than when the market size
asymmetry is moderate.
21The qualitative predictions of the model regarding conﬂicts of interest are the same for
any γ ∈ (0,0.46621).
22However, when the market size asymmetry between the small and the large countries
is moderate, there is no set of parameter conﬁgurations where the merger game played by
governments has an asymmetric PSNE.
228 Extensions
There are many possible directions in which one could extend this model. For
example, one could relax the assumption that there is no bilateral trade between
the small and the large country. In this case competition in domestic markets
would resemble competition in the third country market and so mergers would
be less attractive to ﬁrms than in the model without bilateral trade between the
small and the large countries. In contrast, mergers would be more attractive to
governments since the gains in the export market are the same but the losses in
the domestic are smaller. Thus, bilateral trade between the small and the large
country reduces conﬂicts of interest between ﬁrms and governments.
Another possible extension is to assume that the ﬁrms of the small and large
countries face competition from ﬁrms of the third country market. This would
make mergers less attractive to governments since the losses in the domestic
market are the same but the gains in the export market are smaller. The impact
of competition from ﬁrms in the third country market on incentives for national
ﬁrms to merger in the small and large countries depends on the size of eﬃciency
gains induced by the mergers. Mergers would be less attractive to ﬁrms if
ﬁrm size asymmetries are high and more attractive if ﬁrm size asymmetries are
low. Thus, the presence of additional competitors in the export market should
increase the likelihood of conﬂicts of interest between ﬁrms and governments.
One could also relax the assumption that there are only two national ﬁrms
in each country. Doing that makes the analysis of the merger game considerably
more complicated. For example, if there are three national ﬁrms in each country
we would need to consider all possible merger combinations. We would need to
state not only individually rational constraints for mergers to be viable but also
stability conditions under which the ﬁrms outside the mergers would not make
a better oﬀer to one of the participants in the merger.23
Another possible modiﬁcation of the model would be to model explicitly
a game between national ﬁrms and competition authorities where ﬁrms pro-
pose mergers and competition authorities accept or reject mergers proposed by
ﬁrms. This extension introduces a dynamic aspect to merger analysis in open
economies that has not yet been suﬃciently explored.24 This model would be
a middle ground between the merger game played by ﬁrms and the one played
by governments.
Yet another extension of the model would be to break the assumption that
the ﬁrm size asymmetries in the small and the large country are the same. For
example, one could assume that ﬁrms in the large country are uniformly more
(or less) eﬃcient than ﬁrms in the small country. This extension complicates the
analysis since it is no longer possible to ﬁnd closed form solutions for market size
thresholds that deﬁne the set of equilibria of the model. However, it is possible
to parameterize the model numerically to study this possibility.
23See Barros (1998) and Horn and Persson (2001) for closed economy models of mergers in
markets with two or more ﬁrms.
24See Motta and Vasconcelos (2005) for an example of this type of model in a closed economy.
239 Conclusion
This paper studies incentives for national mergers in a model where ﬁrms of
two countries compete in a third market. The main novelty of the paper is that
it characterizes incentives for national ﬁrms to merge and for governments to
promote national mergers when ﬁrms can have diﬀerent cost of production and
countries can have diﬀerent market demands.
The paper ﬁnds that ﬁrms in the large country have more incentives to
merge than ﬁrms in the small country. In contrast, the government of the large
country has more incentives to block a merger than the government of the small
country. Thus, the model predicts that conﬂicts of interest between governments
and ﬁrms concerning national mergers are more likely in large countries than in
small ones.
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2511 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: I start the proof by deriving the conditions under
which a merger in s is proﬁtable conditional on a given market structure in L. If
s ﬁrms are not merged they sell qs1 = (a−c+∆)/3 and qs2 = (a−c−2∆)/3 in
the s market. In this case, proﬁts of s ﬁrms in the s market are given by πs
s1 =
(a − c + ∆)
2 /9 and πs
s2 = (a − c − 2∆)
2 /9. If L ﬁrms are not merged they sell
qL1 = (a−c+∆)/3γ and qL2 = (a − c − 2∆)/3γ in the L market. Proﬁts of L
ﬁrms in the L market are πL
L1 = (a − c + ∆)
2 /9γ and πL
L2 = (a − c − 2∆)
2 /9γ.





















































Solving this system we obtain qt
s1 = qt
L1 = (a − c + 2∆)/5β and qt
s2 = qt
L2 =
(a − c − 3∆)/5β. The proﬁts of s and L ﬁrms in t are given by πt
s1 = πt
L1 =
(a − c + 2∆)
2 /25β and πt
s2 = πt
L2 = (a − c − 3∆)
2 /25β.
If s ﬁrms merge the s market becomes a monopoly and the equilibrium quantity
is qs1+s2 = (a − c)/2. The monopoly proﬁts are πs1+s2 = (a − c)2/4. If s ﬁrms





































Solving this system we obtain qt
s1+s2 = qt
L1 = (a−c+∆)/4β and qt
L2 = (a−c−
3∆)/4β. The proﬁts of the merged s ﬁrm in t are πt
s1+s2 = (a−c+∆)2/16β. A
merger of s ﬁrms is proﬁtable when L ﬁrms are not merged if the total proﬁts
of the merged s ﬁrm are greater than the sum of the proﬁts of the s ﬁrms before




(a − c + ∆)2
16β
≥
(a − c + ∆)
2
9

















s (δ) which proves part (i). If s ﬁrms are not merged but L ﬁrms are,





































The solution to this system is qt
L1+L2 = qt
s1 = (a − c + ∆)/4β and qt
s2 =
(a − c − 3∆)/4β. The proﬁts of s1 in t are πt
s1 = (a − c + ∆)2/16β and the
proﬁts of s2 are πt
s2 = (a−c−3∆)2/16β. If s ﬁrms merge and so do L ﬁrms we
have a duopoly in the t. In this case the equilibrium quantities in t are qt
s1+s2 =
qt
L1+L2 = (a − c)/3β and proﬁts of the merged s ﬁrm by πt
s1+s2 = (a − c)2/9β.



















(a − c − 3∆)2
16β
.





which proves part (ii). Similarly, a merger of L ﬁrms is proﬁtable when s ﬁrms




(a − c + ∆)2
16β
≥























L (δ) which proves part (iii). A merger of L ﬁrms is proﬁtable when s



















(a − c − 3∆)2
16β
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Table I displays the strategies and payoﬀs of ﬁrms in the merger game played
by ﬁrms. The upper left part of each cell in Table I displays the proﬁts of the
merged ﬁrm in the small country (when ﬁrms in that country choose to merge)
or the sum of proﬁts of the two ﬁrms in the small country (when ﬁrms in that
country choose not to merge) for each of the two possible market conﬁgurations
in the large country. The lower right part of each cell displays the proﬁts of the
merged ﬁrm in the large country (when ﬁrms in that country choose to merge) or
the sum of proﬁts of the two ﬁrms in the large country (when ﬁrms that country
choose not to merge) for each of the two possible market conﬁgurations in the
small country. I will now state a lemma that will be helpful for determining the
equilibria of the merger game played by ﬁrms (Propositions 2 and 3).









L (δ) < fL1+L2
s (δ) < fL1,L2
s (δ).
(ii) If δ = δ
∗(γ), then fs1+s2
L (δ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ) = fL1+L2
s (δ) < fL1,L2
s (δ).
(iii) If (γ,δ) satisfy 0 < γ ≤ 0.79365 and δ




s (δ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ) < fL1,L2
s (δ).
(iv) If 0.79365 < γ < 1, then fs1+s2
L (δ) < fL1+L2
s (δ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ) < fL1,L2
s (δ).
(v) If γ = 1, then fs1+s2
L (δ) = fL1+L2
s (δ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ) = fL1,L2
s (δ).
Proof of Lemma 1: The expression for δ




L (δ) with respect to δ. Now, 0 < γ < 0.79365 implies 0 ≤ δ
∗(γ) ≤ 0.0(6).
So, if 0 < γ < 0.79365 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ
∗(γ), then f
s1,s2
L (δ) < fL1+L2
s (δ). However,
if 0 < γ ≤ 0.79365 and δ
∗(γ) < δ ≤ 0.0(6), then fL1+L2





L (δ) and fL1+L2
s (δ) imply that f
s1+s2
L (δ) < fL1+L2
s (δ) for
γ ∈ (0,1) and fs1+s2
L (δ) = fL1+L2
s (δ) when γ = 1. Similarly, the deﬁnitions
of f
s1,s2
L (δ) and fL1,L2
s (δ) imply that f
s1,s2
L (δ) < fL1,L2
s (δ) for γ ∈ (0,1) and
fs1+s2
L (δ) = fL1+L2
s (δ) when γ = 1. It is straightforward to show that these
results imply (i) though (v). Q.E.D.
28Proof of Proposition 2:
(i) If 0.79365 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ), then Lemma 1 part (iv) implies
β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ) < fL1,L2
s (δ). Proposition 1 parts (i) and (ii) together with
β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ) < fL1,L2
s (δ) imply that m is a dominated strategy for ﬁrms in
s. Thus, ﬁrms in s choose n. If β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ), then Lemma 1 part (iv) also
implies β < f
s1,s2
L (δ). Proposition 1 part (iii) together with β < f
s1,s2
L (δ) imply
that the best response of ﬁrms in L to n is N. So, ﬁrms in L will play N. Thus,
for 0.79365 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ), we have NE(F2,γ) = (n,N).
(ii) If 0.79365 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and fL1+L2
s (δ)} < β ≤ f
s1,s2
L (δ), then Lemma 1 part (iv)
implies fs1+s2
L (δ) < fL1+L2
s (δ) < β ≤ f
s1,s2
L (δ) < fL1,L2
s (δ). If fL1+L2
s (δ) < β <
fL1,L2
s (δ), then Proposition 1 part (i) implies that the best response of ﬁrms in
s to N is n and Proposition 1 part (ii) implies that the best response of ﬁrms in
s to M is m. If fs1+s2
L (δ) < β ≤ f
s1,s2
L (δ), then Proposition 1 part (iii) implies
that the best response of ﬁrms in L to n is N and Proposition 1 part (iv) implies
that the best response of ﬁrms in L to m is M. Thus, (n,N) and (m,M) are
PSNE of F2,γ when 0.79365 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and fL1+L2
s (δ)} < β ≤ f
s1,s2
L (δ). It is a
well know result that the number of Nash equilibria of this type of game must
be odd. Since there is no other PSNE we must have a MSNE. By deﬁnition, in
a MSNE ﬁrms in s randomize between m and n to make ﬁrms in L indiﬀerent





















































where ps is the probability that ﬁrms in s choose m. Solving this equation for ps
we obtain (1). Firms in L randomize between M and N to make ﬁrms in s indif-
ferent between m and n. Let pL denote the probability that ﬁrms in L choose M.




L (δ), we have NE(F2,γ) = {(n,N),(m,M),(ps,m;pL,M)}.
(iii) If 0.79365 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and f
s1,s2
L (δ) < β, then Lemma 1 part (iv) implies
f
s1+s2
L (δ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ) < β. Proposition 1 parts (iii) and (iv) together with
f
s1+s2
L (δ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ) < β imply that N is a dominated strategy for ﬁrms in L.
Thus, ﬁrms in L choose M. If f
s1,s2
L (δ) < β, then Lemma 1 part (iv) also implies
fL1+L2
s (δ) < β. Proposition 1 part (ii) together with fL1+L2
s (δ) < β imply that
the best response of ﬁrms in s to M is m. So, ﬁrms in s choose m. Thus, for
0.79365 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ), we have NE(F2,γ) = (m,M). Q.E.D.
29Proof of Proposition 3:
(i) If 0 < γ < 0.79365 and β ≤ min{fL1+L2
s (δ),f
s1,s2
L (δ)}, then Lemma 1 parts
(i) or (iii) imply β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ) < fL1,L2
s (δ). Proposition 1 parts (i) and (ii)
together with β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ) < fL1,L2
s (δ) imply that m is a dominated strategy
for ﬁrms in s. Thus, ﬁrms in s choose n. If β ≤ f
s1,s2
L (δ), then Proposition 1
part (iii) implies that the best response of ﬁrms in L to n is N. So, ﬁrms in L




have NE(F2,γ) = (n,N).
(ii) If 0 < γ < 0.79365 and f
s1,s2
L (δ) ≤ β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ), then Lemma 1 part
(i) implies f
s1+s2
L (δ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ) ≤ β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ) < fL1,L2
s (δ). Proposition 1
parts (iii) and (iv) together with f
s1+s2
L (δ) < f
s1,s2
L (δ) ≤ β imply that N is a
dominated strategy for ﬁrms in L. Thus, ﬁrms in L choose M. Proposition
1 parts (i) and (ii) together with β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ) < fL1,L2
s (δ) imply that m
is a dominated strategy for ﬁrms in s. So, ﬁrms in s choose n. Thus, for
0 < γ < 0.79365 and f
s1,s2
L (δ) ≤ β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ) we have NE(F2,γ) = (n,M).
(iii) Similar to part (ii) of Proposition 2.
(iv) Similar to part (iii) of Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: I start the proof by stating conditions under which
a domestic merger improves national welfare for a given market structure in L.
Consumer surplus at s is given by CSs = (a−ps)Qs/2 = Q2
s/2,where Qs is total
output produced by s ﬁrms. If s ﬁrms do not merge, then Qs = (2a−2c−∆)/3
and CSs
s1,s2 = (2a − 2c − ∆)
2 /18. If s ﬁrms merge, then Qs = (a − c)/2 and
CSs
s1+s2 = (a − c)2/8.








(a − c + ∆)2
16β
≥

























s (δ) which proves part (i). A merger of ﬁrms in s will improve national


























(a − c − 3∆)2
16β
.
Solving this inequality with respect to β we obtain β ≤ −1+18δ−45δ2
5−32δ+44δ2 = gL1+L2
s (δ)
which proves part (ii). I will now state conditions under which a L merger
improves L welfare conditional on a given market structure in s. Consumer
30surplus in L is given by CSL = (a−pL)QL/2 = γQ2
L/2,where QL is total output
produced by L ﬁrms. If L ﬁrms do not merge, then QL = (2a−2c−∆)/3γ and
CSL
L1,L2 = (2a − 2c − ∆)
2 /18γ. If L ﬁrms merge, then QL = (a − c)/2γ and
CSL
L1+L2 = (a − c)2/8γ.








(a − c + ∆)2
16β
≥



























L (δ) which proves part (iii). A merger of ﬁrms in L will improve national


























(a − c − 3∆)2
16β
.
Solving this inequality with respect to β we obtain β ≤ γ −1+18δ−45δ2
5−32δ+44δ2 = gs1+s2
L (δ)





































































31Table II displays the strategies and payoﬀs of governments in the merger game
played by governments. The upper left part of each cell in Table II displays the
sum of consumer surplus and proﬁts of the merged ﬁrm in the small country
(when ﬁrms in that country are merged) or with proﬁts of the two ﬁrms in
the small country (when ﬁrms in that country are not merged) for each market
conﬁguration in the large country. The lower right part of each cell displays the
sum of consumer surplus and proﬁts of the merged ﬁrm in the large country
(when ﬁrms in that country are merged) or with proﬁts of the two ﬁrms in
the large country (when ﬁrms in that country are not merged) for each market
conﬁguration in the small country. I will now state a lemma that will be help-
ful for determining the equilibria of the merger game played by governments
(Propositions 5 and 6).
Lemma 2 Let ˆ δ(γ) =
63−50γ
549−750γ.




s (δ) < gs1+s2
L (δ) < gL1+L2
s (δ).
(ii) If δ = ˆ δ(γ) then g
s1,s2
L (δ) < gL1,L2
s (δ) = g
s1+s2
L (δ) < gL1+L2
s (δ).




L (δ) < gL1,L2
s (δ) < gL1+L2
s (δ).
(iv) If 0.46621 < γ < 1, then g
s1,s2
L (δ) < gL1,L2
s (δ) < g
s1+s2
L (δ) < gL1+L2
s (δ).
(v) If γ = 1, then g
s1,s2
L (δ) = gL1,L2
s (δ) < g
s1+s2
L (δ) = gL1+L2
s (δ).




L (δ) with respect to δ. Now, 0 < γ ≤ 0.46621 implies 0.11475 < ˆ δ(γ) ≤
0.1991. So, if 0 < γ ≤ 0.46621 and ˆ δ(γ) ≤ δ ≤ 0.1991, then gs1+s2
L (δ) <
gL1,L2




L (δ). The deﬁnitions of g
s1+s2
L (δ) and gL1+L2




s (δ) for γ ∈ (0,1) and g
s1+s2
L (δ) = gL1+L2
s (δ) when γ = 1. Similarly,
the deﬁnitions of g
s1,s2
L (δ) and gL1,L2
s (δ) imply that g
s1,s2
L (δ) < gL1,L2
s (δ) for
γ ∈ (0,1) and gs1+s2
L (δ) = gL1+L2
s (δ) when γ = 1. It is straightforward to show
that these results imply (i) though (v). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5:
(i) If 0.46621 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and gs1+s2
L (δ) < β, then Lemma 2 part (iv) implies
gL1,L2
s (δ) < gL1+L2
s (δ) < β. Proposition 4 parts (i) and (ii) together with
gL1,L2
s (δ) < gL1+L2
s (δ) < β imply that m is a dominated strategy for the gov-
ernment of s. Thus, the government of s chooses n. If g
s1+s2
L (δ) < β, then
Lemma 2 part (iv) also implies g
s1,s2
L (δ) < β. Proposition 4 part (iii) together
with g
s1,s2
L (δ) < β imply that the best response of the government of L to n is N.
So, the government of L plays N. Thus, for 0.46621 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and g
s1+s2
L (δ) < β
we have NE(G2,γ) = (n,N).
(ii) If 0.46621 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and gL1,L2
s (δ) < β ≤ g
s1+s2
L (δ), then Lemma 2 part
(iv) implies g
s1,s2
L (δ) < gL1,L2
s (δ) < β ≤ g
s1+s2
L (δ) < gL1+L2
s (δ). If gL1,L2
s (δ) <
β < gL1+L2
s (δ), then Proposition 4 part (i) implies that the best response of
the government of s to N is n and Proposition 4 part (ii) implies that the
32best response of the government of s to M is m. If g
s1,s2
L (δ) < β ≤ gs1+s2
L (δ),
then Proposition 4 part (iii) implies that the best response of the government
of L to n is N and Proposition 4 part (iv) implies that the best response of
the government of L to m is M. Thus, (n,N) and (m,M) are PSNE of G2,γ
when 0.46621 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and gL1,L2
s (δ) < β ≤ g
s1+s2
L (δ). It is a well know result
that the number of Nash equilibria of this type of game must be odd. Since
there is no other PSNE we must have a MSNE. By deﬁnition, in a MSNE the
government of s randomizes between m and n to make the government of L





























(a − c + ∆)





(a − c + ∆)2 + (a − c − 3∆)2
16β
+ (1 − qs)





(a − c + ∆)









where qs is the probability that the government of s chooses m. Solving this
equation for qs we obtain (3). The government of L randomizes between M and
N to make the government of s indiﬀerent between m and n. Let qL denote
the probability that the government of L chooses M. Setting γ = 1 in (3) we
obtain (4). Thus, for 0.46621 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and gL1,L2
s (δ) < β ≤ gs1+s2
L (δ), we have
NE(G2,γ) = {(n,N),(m,M),(qs,m;qL,M)}.
(iii) If 0.46621 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and β ≤ gL1,L2
s (δ), then Lemma 2 part (iv) implies
β < gL1,L2
s (δ) < gL1+L2
s (δ). Proposition 4 parts (iii) and (iv) together with β <
gL1,L2
s (δ) < gL1+L2
s (δ) imply that n is a dominated strategy for the government
of s. Thus, the government of s chooses m. If β ≤ gL1,L2
s (δ), then Lemma 2
part (iv) also implies β < gs1+s2
L (δ). Proposition 4 part (iv) together withβ <
g
s1+s2
L (δ) imply that the best response of the government of L to m is M. So,
the government of L plays M. Thus, for 0.46621 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and β ≤ gL1,L2
s (δ) we
have NE(G2,γ) = (m,M). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6:
(i) If 0 < γ < 0.46621 and max{gs1+s2
L (δ),gL1,L2
s (δ)} < β, then Lemma 2 part
(i) or (iii) imply g
s1,s2
L (δ) < gs1+s2
L (δ) < β. Proposition 4 parts (iii) and (iv)
together with g
s1,s2
L (δ) < gs1+s2
L (δ) < β imply that M is a dominated strategy
for the government of L. Thus, the government of L chooses N. If gL1,L2
s (δ) < β,
then Proposition 4 part (ii) implies that the best response of the government of
s to N is n. So, the government of s plays n. Thus, for 0.46621 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and
33max{gs1+s2
L (δ),gL1,L2
s (δ)} < β we have NE(G2,γ) = (n,N).
(ii) If 0 < γ < 0.46621 and g
s1+s2
L (δ) ≤ β ≤ gL1,L2
s (δ), then Lemma 2 part
(iii) implies g
s1,s2
L (δ) < g
s1+s2
L (δ) ≤ β ≤ gL1,L2
s (δ) < gL1+L2
s (δ). Proposition
4 parts (iii) and (iv) together with g
s1,s2
L (δ) < g
s1+s2
L (δ) ≤ β imply that M
is a dominated strategy for the government of L. Thus, the government of
L chooses N. Proposition 4 parts (i) and (ii) together with β ≤ gL1,L2
s (δ) <
gL1+L2
s (δ) imply that n is a dominated strategy for the government of s. So,
the government of s plays m. Thus, for 0 < γ < 0.79365 and f
s1,s2
L (δ) ≤ β ≤
fL1+L2
s (δ) we have NE(G2,γ) = (m,N).
(iii) Similar to part (ii) of Proposition 5.
(iv) Similar to part (iii) of Proposition 5. Q.E.D.
Proposition 7: Let 0.79365 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
(i) If (β,δ) satisfy 0 < β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ), then NE(F2,γ) = NE(G2,γ) = (n,N);
(ii) If (β,δ) satisfy max{f
s1,s2
L (δ),gs1+s2
L (δ)} ≤ β ≤ 1, then NE(F2,γ) =
(m,M)  = (n,N) = NE(G2,γ);
(iii) If (β,δ) satisfy 0 < β ≤ min{gL1,L2
s (δ),1}, then NE(F2,γ) = NE(G2,γ) =
(m,M).
Proof of Proposition 7: The proof follows from Propositions 2 and 5. Q.E.D.
Proposition 8: Let 0.46621 ≤ γ < 0.79365.
(i) If (β,δ) satisfy 0 < β ≤ min{fL1+L2
s (δ),f
s1,s2
L (δ)}, then NE(F2,γ) =
NE(G2,γ) = (n,N);
(ii) If (β,δ) satisfy f
s1,s2
L (δ) ≤ β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ), then NE(F2,γ) = (n,M)  =
(n,N) = NE(G2,γ);





L (δ)} ≤ β ≤ 1, then
NE(F2,γ) = (m,M)  = (n,N) = NE(G2,γ);
(iv) If (β,δ) satisfy 0 < β ≤ min{gL1,L2
s (δ),1}, then NE(F2,γ) = NE(G2,γ) =
(m,M).
Proof of Proposition 8: The proof follows from Propositions 3 and 5. Q.E.D.
Proposition 9: Let 0 < γ < 0.46621.
(i) If (β,δ) satisfy 0 < β ≤ min{fL1+L2
s (δ),f
s1,s2
L (δ)}, then NE(F2,γ) =
NE(G2,γ) = (n,N);
(ii) If (β,δ) satisfy f
s1,s2
L (δ) ≤ β ≤ fL1+L2
s (δ), then NE(F2,γ) = (n,M)  =
(n,N) = NE(G2,γ);





s (δ)} ≤ β ≤ 1,
then NE(F2,γ) = (m,M)  = (n,N) = NE(G2,γ);
(iv) If (β,δ) satisfy gs1+s2
L (δ) < β ≤ gL1,L2
s (δ), then NE(F2,γ) = (m,M)  =
(m,N) = NE(G2,γ);
(v) If (β,δ) satisfy 0 < β ≤ min{gL1,L2
s (δ),g
s1+s2
L (δ),1}, then NE(F2,γ) =
NE(G2,γ) = (m,M).
Proof of Proposition 9: The proof follows from Propositions 3 and 6. Q.E.D.
34